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a b s t r a c t
The axioms of projective and affine plane geometry are turned into rules of proof by which
formal derivations are constructed. The rules act only on atomic formulas. It is shown that
proof search for the derivability of atomic cases from atomic assumptions by these rules
terminates (i.e., solves the word problem). This decision method is based on the central
result of the combinatorial analysis of derivations by the geometric rules: The geometric
objects that occur in derivations by the rules can be restricted to those known from the
assumptions and cases. This ‘‘subterm property’’ is proved by permuting suitably the order
of application of the geometric rules. As an example of the decision method, it is shown
that there cannot exist a derivation of Euclid’s fifth postulate if the rule that corresponds
to the uniqueness of the parallel line construction is taken away from the system of plane
affine geometry.
© 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The study of the main foundational questions, such as the consistency, completeness, and decision problem of a
mathematical theory, requires the formalization of proofs. The standard way to achieve formalization is to write out the
axioms as formulas in a logical language. Proofs are represented as formal derivations by the rules of logic.
Recently, an approach has been proposed that avoids the use of logic in the formalization of axioms [5,4]. It is applicable
to theories the axioms of which belong to the class of ‘‘geometric implications’’ (a somewhat unfortunate terminology
that stems from category theory). Each axiom becomes a rule for the construction of formal derivations. In many theories,
each rule has some finite number of premisses and just one conclusion. Derivations from given assumptions to a given
conclusion are combinations of instances of rules such that each premiss is an assumption or a conclusion of a rule, with
each conclusion in turn the premiss of exactly one rule, except for the conclusion of the whole derivation. Thus, derivations
can be represented as finitely branching trees. A generalization of this structure is needed in theories the axioms of which
contain genuine alternative cases. The overall result for both kinds of theories is that steps of derivation constructed by
the rules of a mathematical theory can be completely separated from proof steps that use logical rules to infer a logically
compound formula (one with connectives or quantifiers).
A typical form of an axiom has free parameters as in, say, the axioms of an equality relation:
a = a, a = b ⊃ b = a, a = b & b = c ⊃ a = c
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These axioms have an infinity of instances if the set of given objects a, b, c, . . . is infinite. The same happens if the axioms
are converted into rules:
a = a Ref
a = b
b = a Sym
a = b b = c
a = c Tr
Note that Ref is a zero-premiss rule. In rule Tr, given the conclusion a = c , there are an infinity of possible values of the
‘‘middle term’’ b that could be used for deriving a = c from the two premisses a = b and b = c. However, if the task is to
determinewhether an equality a = c is derivable by the rules of an equality relation from a given finite number of equalities
a1 = c1, . . . , an = cn used as assumptions, the middle terms in Tr can be restricted to those known from these assumptions
and the purported conclusion. There is a bounded number of distinct equalities if the number of terms in the equalities is
bounded. Now, starting from the assumptions and from instances of the zero-premiss rule, rules Sym and Tr are applied in
all manner of ways to construct all possible derivations. Applications of rules that conclude formulas found already higher
up in a derivation are not permitted, because all parts of derivations between such repetitions of the same equality can be
deleted as useless. It follows that there is only a bounded number of derivations in which each conclusion is a new equality.
Therefore the question of derivability of an equality from given equalities is decidable, so the ‘‘word problem’’ for the theory
of equality has a positive solution.
The above rules for equality display one essential feature of mathematical rules in general, namely that the premisses
and the conclusion are atomic formulas of a theory, not ones with logical connectives or quantifiers. The basic result of the
analysis of logical derivations by themethods of Gentzen’s proof theory shows that there is no need to consider logical rules
if the assumptions and the conclusion are atomic formulas. It is therefore possible to separate derivations into parts with
only mathematical rules, followed by parts that apply only the rules of logic.
The possibility to restrict the objects in a derivation to those known from the assumptions or the conclusion is called the
subterm property. It is quite easy to prove this property for the theory of equality: Let there be some unknown term b in a
derivation. Considering the derivation ‘‘top-down’’, b cannot appear in an assumption, so it first appears in the derivation in
an instance of Ref. If the following rule is Sym, the instance of Sym can be deleted as its conclusion and premiss are identical.
Hence, the rule will be Tr, but it can also be deleted because its conclusion and one of its premisses are identical.
The main result below is a proof of the subterm property for plane projective and affine geometries. It is not possible
to apply the easy top-down argument as for the theory of equality. Instead, downmost occurrences of unknown terms are
considered. The method is to show that rules with such occurrences can be permuted up to yield a derivation in a certain
standard form to which a combinatorial analysis can be applied.
The axiomatizations of projective and affine geometry include the axiom of noncollinearity, i.e., of the existence of at
least three noncollinear points. It is shown that this axiom, when converted into a suitable rule, is conservative over the
other rules: If a finite number of atomic cases is derivable by all the rules from a given finite number of atomic assumptions,
the rule of noncollinearity is not needed. (Thus, a proper use of existential axioms requires existential conclusions.) By the
subterm property for the rules with noncollinearity excluded, derivability by the rules of projective and affine geometry is
decidable.
To illustrate the decision method, we give two brief applications. First, it follows at once that any finite set of atomic
formulas is consistent. Secondly, the independence of the parallel postulate in affine geometry can be proved purely
syntactically: A very short proof search is exhaustive but fails to give a derivation. Thus, we see, within the system of
geometry, that no derivation can lead to the parallel postulate.
It should be noted that the solution to the decision problem for projective and affine geometries applies only to
derivations by the geometric rules. When logical rules are applied, to conclude logically compound formulas, the decision
problem is known to have, by a result announced first in [12], a negative solution. Finally, it should be noted that the decision
methods presented here are bounded, provably terminating algorithms. Earlier results in this direction have often given
decidability in the weak sense of impossibility of undecidability and no upper bound.
2. The axioms and rules of projective geometry
2.1. Basic relations and constructions
We use a two-sorted predicate calculus with two types of basic objects, points and lines. ‘‘Given’’ points and lines in
the axioms and rules are denoted by the parameters a, b, c, . . . and l,m, n, . . ., respectively. Variables x, y, z, . . . are used in
ruleswith eigenvariables and as bound variables. The notation is slightly overloaded, but it is always seenwhether a variable
stands for a point or a line. The basic relations (atomic formulas) of projective geometry are as follows:
(2.1) a = b, a and b are equal points,
(2.2) l = m, l andm are equal lines,
(2.3) a ∈ l, point a is incident with line l.
Next we have two constructions:
(2.4) ln(a, b), the connecting line of points a, b,
(2.5) pt(l,m), the intersection point of lines l,m.
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These constructions can be iterated any number of times as in, say,
ln(pt(ln(a, b),m), c)
2.2. The geometric axioms
The axioms are grouped into general axioms for the basic relations, axioms for constructed objects, uniqueness axioms
for the constructions, substitution axioms, and existential axioms:
I Axioms for equality relations:
a = a, a = b ⊃ b = a, a = b & b = c ⊃ a = c,
l = l, l = m ⊃ m = l, l = m &m = n ⊃ l = n
Constructed objects obey incidence properties expressed by the next group of axioms:
II Incidence axioms for connecting lines and intersection points:
a ∈ ln(a, b), b ∈ ln(a, b), pt(l,m) ∈ l, pt(l,m) ∈ m
Uniqueness of connecting lines and intersection points is guaranteed by an axiom found by Skolem [11]:
III The projective uniqueness axiom:
a ∈ l & a ∈ m & b ∈ l & b ∈ m ⊃ a = b ∨ l = m
We note that this axiom concludes two possible cases. Next, principles are needed that guarantee the substitutability of
equals in the incidence relation:
IV Projective substitution axioms:
a ∈ l & a = b ⊃ b ∈ l, a ∈ l & l = m ⊃ a ∈ m
V Existence of three noncollinear points:
∃x∃y∃z(¬x = y & ¬z ∈ ln(x, y))
The dual form ∃x∃y∃z(¬x = y &¬pt(x, y) ∈ z), by which there exist three nonconcurrent lines, is derivable. Point and line
variables are distinguished by the places in which they occur in formulas.
2.3. From axioms to rules of proof
The geometric axioms can be converted into rules for the construction of formal derivations. Given an axiom of the
general form P1 & · · · & Pm ⊃ Q1 ∨ · · · ∨ Qn, with the Pi,Qj atomic formulas, the corresponding rule is
P1 . . . Pm
Q1 . . . Qn (2.1)
Here the atomic formulas (atoms) P1, . . . , Pm are the premisses and the atoms Q1, . . . ,Qn the conclusions, withm, n ⩾ 0.
If m = 0, we have a zero-premiss rule, and if n = 0, we have a rule with an empty conclusion. The conclusions of a rule
are read disjunctively, the premisses conjunctively. If rules are restricted to having just one conclusion, logical notation is
needed, as when an axiom of the form P & Q ⊃ R ∨ S is written as a rule.
Any universal axiom, written with free parameters, can be converted to conjunctive normal form. Each conjunct can be
expressed as an implication of the form that converts to a rule of the form (2.1).
The atoms of geometry contain free parameters and therefore the geometric rules are schematic. When values are given
to these, a rule instance is obtained. To define what derivations by rules of the form (2.1) are, we consider first a special
case of (2.1), then move to the general case.
Let the rules of a system be such that n = 1. A derivation by such rules is a finite collection of rule instances that together
form a derivation tree: Each formula in the tree except for the endformula is an assumption in exactly one rule, and each
formula in the tree except for a topformula is the conclusion of exactly one rule.
We consider the tree structure as a directed graph, with the endformula as the least element, and any two formula
occurrences in the graph ordered if one formula is the conclusion in a rule instance in which the other is a premiss. Chains
in the ordering correspond to branches in a derivation tree. With rules that permit more than one conclusion, the simple
geometric tree structure of derivations is lost, but the definition of a derivation is analogous and is based on the graph
structure imposed by the rule instances. When in a tree derivation a formula in the tree defines a subtree, in the more
general situation of rules with several conclusions, an upward and a downward subtree are determined, by closure of the
partial order in one or the other direction.
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Themost important condition for a collection of rule instances to formaderivation is that no two conclusions in a rule lead
lower down to premisses in one and the same rule. This would be a logical error because the conclusions are disjunctive, the
premisses instead conjunctive.We say that the derivation has no cycles. Furthermore, the rule instancesmust be connected
so that at least one formula in each rule instance is a premiss or a conclusion in some other rule instance. Thus, derivations
are combinatorially seen finite directed graphs with upward and downward branchings and no cycles.
Let P ≺i Q mean that P is a premiss in a rule instance Ri in which Q is a conclusion.
Definition 2.1. A derivation by a system of rules of the form (2.1) consists of a finite collection of rule instances R1, . . . , Rn
such that:
1. If n > 1, the instances are connected: There is for each Ri some distinct Rj and three atoms P,Q , S such that either
P ≺i Q ,Q ≺j S or P ≺j Q ,Q ≺i S.
2. No formula occurrence in a rule instance as a premiss is a formula occurrence as a premiss in another rule, and the same
for formula occurrences as conclusions.
3. The graph that corresponds to the rule instances R1, . . . , Rn has no cycles.
By 1 and 2, each formula occurrence in a derivation, considered as a graph, is a conclusion of at most one rule instance, and
similarly for premisses.1
We say that derivations that follow rule scheme (2.1) with conditions 1–3 of the definition are written in natural deduction
style. The qualifications ‘‘instance’’ and ‘‘occurrence’’ are usually dropped when rule instances and formula occurrences in
derivations are considered. Formulas in a derivation that are not conclusions of some rule are the (open) assumptions of
the derivation. Formulas in a derivation that are not the premisses of some rule are the (open) cases of the derivation.
As a limiting case of zero rule instances, we have derivations of the form
P
in which the atom P is at the same time an assumption and a case.
Derivations as defined in (2.1) need not be representable in two dimensions. However, all those parts of derivations that
we need to consider can be printed in two dimensions provided that we permit the reordering of premisses and conclusions.
We refer to them as the first premiss (P1 in the rule scheme), the second premiss, and so on, and similarly for the conclusions.
A thread in a derivation is a sequence of formulas (P1, . . . , Pn) such that P1 is an assumption (topformula), Pn a case
(endformula), and for each i, Pi+1, there is a rule instance Rk such that Pi ≺k Pi+1, with 1 ⩽ i < n.
A derivation has a loop if it has a thread of the form
(P1, . . . , P, . . . , P, . . . , Pn)
Consider an occurrence of formula P in a derivation. It determines upward branches from P and downward roots from P
in the following way: Take first all possible threads (P1, . . . , P, . . . , Pn) that pass through P . Upward branches from P are
the sequences (P1, . . . , P), and downward roots from P the sequences (P, . . . , Pn).
If the number of cases in each rule in a derivation is at most one, the derivation is in tree form. Dually, if the number of
premisses is at most one, the derivation is in root form.
Given a derivationD and a formula P in it, the upward subderivation determined by P is obtained by deleting the roots
that start with the occurrence of P while maintaining P as a case. The downward subderivation is obtained analogously.
The logical rules have to be formulated suitably when a calculus in natural deduction style with multiple conclusions is
used for the representation of axioms. The essential point is that disjunction elimination must be written as a rule in which
there are two cases below the inference line, as found already indicated in [2]. Such calculi have not been very popular, and
we give instead a sequent calculus formulation for which the logical part is well established.
2.4. Sequent calculus representation of mathematical rules
We write first derivations by mathematical rules in a sequent notation that collects the assumptions and cases of a
derivation into a single line. A sequent Γ → ∆ expresses that there is a derivation with Γ as assumptions and ∆ as cases.
We say that the sequent Γ → ∆ is derivable if there is such a derivation. The number of occurrences of a formula as an
assumption or a case is counted, so Γ and ∆ are finite multisets. If Γ ∗ is obtained from Γ by multiplying a formula in Γ
m ⩾ 0 times, amultiset reduct of Γ is obtained.
The limiting case of one formula A as an assumption and a case is given in the sequent notation as A→ A.
1 Definition 2.1 is a straightforward generalization of the definition of a derivation in Gentzen’s thesis [2, p. 181]: ‘‘A derivation consists of a number (at
least one) of formulas that form among themselves inference figures as follows: Each formula is the conclusion of at most one inference figure and the
premiss of at least one inference figure, except for just one, the endformula, and the collection of inference figures is free of cycles’’. In this carefully laid out
definition, multiple use of a single formula occurrence as a premiss is permitted. Tree derivations come out as a special case when the condition ‘‘at least’’
is deleted.
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Table 2.1
The logical rules of sequent calculus.
Am, Bn,Γ →∆
A & B,Γ →∆ L&
Γ1→∆1, Am Γ2→∆2, Bn
Γ1,Γ2→∆1,∆2, A & B R&
Am,Γ1→∆1 Bn,Γ2→∆2
A ∨ B,Γ1,Γ2→∆1,∆2 L∨
Γ →∆, Am, Bn












Γ →∆, ∃xA(x) R∃
The general scheme (2.1) for mathematical rules becomes in sequent notation, with a comma indicating multiset union,
Γ1→∆1, P1 . . . Γm→∆m, Pm
Γ1, . . . ,Γm→∆1, . . . ,∆m,Q1, . . . ,Qn
Possible extra assumptions and cases not written out in scheme (2.1) are here shown explicitly.
If a sequent Γ →∆ is derivable and if the derivation has a loop, elimination of the loop typically gives a result Γ ∗→∆∗
with multiset reducts. To show that such elimination is always possible, we need to show that a rule of composition of
derivations is admissible. Admissibility of a rule relative to a given system of rules requires that the conclusion of the rule
be derivable whenever its premisses are derivable.
It can be shown that the rules of logical inference donot interferewith derivations bymathematical rules of the form (2.1).
Specifically, steps of logical inference can be permuted down relative to the mathematical rules. Therefore the question of
the derivability of given atomic cases ∆ from given atomic assumptions Γ concerns only the mathematical rules. For the
sake of completeness, we give here a system of logical rules in the notation of sequent calculus (from [6]). They are divided
into left rules that modify the assumption parts of derivations, and into right rules that modify the parts with cases (see
Table 2.1).
Implication is considered a defined connective. In the rules, any multiplicities m, n ⩾ 0 of formulas can appear in the
premisses. In the quantifier rules R∀ and L∃, y is an eigenvariable, not free in the conclusion. The formulawith a connective or
quantifier in the conclusion of a rule is the principal formula of that rule. The formulas written out separately in premisses
of the rules are the active formulas of the corresponding rule. Initial sequents are of the form A→ A, with A an arbitrary
formula. The last sequent of a derivation is its endsequent. Some example derivations can be found in Section 2.5.
The rule for composing derivations by mathematical rules is in sequent calculus notation
Γ1→∆1, P P,Γ2→∆2
Γ1,Γ2→∆1,∆2 Comp
Lemma 2.2 (Admissibility of composition). The rule of composition is admissible in systems of rules that follow scheme (2.1).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of steps of inference of the right premiss of rule Comp. We show that
instances of Comp can be permuted up until they disappear.
The base case is the derivation P→ P , with the instance of Comp
Γ1→∆1, P P→ P
Γ1→∆1, P Comp
Thus, the conclusion is equal to the left premiss and the instance of Comp can be deleted. In the inductive case, the last rule
in the derivation of the right premiss of Comp has the form
P,Γ21→∆21 , P1 . . . Γ2m→∆2m , Pm
P,Γ2→∆21 , . . . ,∆2m ,Q1, . . . ,Qn Rule
Here Γ21 , . . . ,Γ2m ≡ Γ2, and ∆21 , . . . ,∆2m ,Q1, . . . ,Qn ≡ ∆2. We may assume the composition formula in the second
premiss of Comp to come from the first premiss of Rule. By the inductive hypothesis, composition of the first premiss of Comp
with P,Γ21 → ∆21 , P1 is admissible, the conclusion being Γ1,Γ21 → ∆1,∆21 , P1. Now Rule is applied with this sequent as
the first premiss, and with the same conclusion as in the original instance of Comp. QED.
Consider a derivation of Γ →∆with a loop as in the thread
(P1, . . . , P, . . . , P, . . . , Pk)
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The loop can be eliminated as follows: The first occurrence of P in the thread determines an upward subderivation, of a
sequent Γ1 → ∆1, P and the second a downward subderivation, of a sequent P,Γ2 → ∆2. By the rule of composition,
these can be put together into a derivation of Γ1,Γ2→ ∆1,∆2. Branches and roots between the two occurrences of P in
the original derivation have been removed, so the result of composition gives a multiset reduct of the original derivation,
namely a derivation that is sharper in the sense of having fewer cases derived from fewer assumptions.
In the natural deduction style of writing derivations, each conclusion is by definition a premiss in the next rule or a
case of the whole derivation. This will turn out a very useful property in the proofs of the main Lemmas 3.2 and 4.1. In
sequent calculus style, conclusions can instead remain inactive. We shall see that it is always possible to permute the order
of application of sequent calculus rules so that the conditions on order of application of rules, required by the proofs of the
lemmas, are met. A further drawback of the sequent notation is that derivations grow too broad to be printed. We shall for
these reasons use the more readable natural deduction style in the proofs of the main Lemmas 3.2 and 4.1.
2.5. The rules of projective geometry
The rules of projective geometry that correspond to axioms I–IV are:
I Rules for equality relations:
a = a Ref
a = b
b = a Sym
a = b b = c
a = c Tr
l = l Ref
l = m
m = l Sym
l = m m = n
l = n Tr
II Rules for incidence:
a ∈ ln(a, b) ILn1 b ∈ ln(a, b) ILn2
pt(l,m) ∈ l IPt1 pt(l,m) ∈ m IPt2
III Uniqueness rule:
a ∈ l a ∈ m b ∈ l b ∈ m
a = b l = m Uni
IV Substitution rules:
a ∈ l a = b
b ∈ l SPt
a ∈ l l = m
a ∈ m SLn
For axiomV,we use a dual ‘‘co-geometric’’ form of the geometric rule scheme of Negri [4] (note that ‘‘geometric’’ there refers
to categorical logic and has, apparently, little connection to geometry in the ordinary sense):
V Rule of noncollinearity:
x = y
ET,1
z ∈ ln(x, y)
ET,1
The rule closes the possible cases x = y and z ∈ ln(x, y) in roots of a derivation. A numerical label is needed for indicating
which atoms go together in an application of the rule, similarly to the use of discharge labels next to rule symbols and above
discharged formulas in natural deduction. There can be any numbersm ⩾ 0, n ⩾ 0 of occurrences of x = y and z ∈ ln(x, y)
that are closed in one rule instance (as long as there is at least one of either). In the rule, x, y, and z are the eigenvariables,
assumed pairwise distinct and with no free occurrences of the eigenvariables in the remaining assumptions or cases of the
derivation.
In words, rule ET states that if it can be derived that the cases under Γ include that any two points x, y are equal, or (if
not, then at least) that any third point z is incident with the line ln(x, y), then these two cases can be excluded.
Rule ET can be written in a ‘‘local’’ style by the use of sequent calculus notation. The general case of arbitrary numbers
m ⩾ 0, n ⩾ 0 of the two cases x = y and z ∈ ln(x, y) is indicated by x = ym and z ∈ ln(x, y)n
Γ →∆, x = ym, z ∈ ln(x, y)n
Γ →∆ ET
The condition on the eigenvariables x, y, z is that they must not be free in the conclusion Γ →∆ of the rule.
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The axioms of projective geometry are derivable by the rules. In the other direction, the rules are derivable from the
axioms. The derivations are written in sequent notation so that the logical rules of Table 2.1 can be used. We show first that
transitivity of point equality as an axiom is derivable by rule Tr and logical rules:
a = b→ a = b b = c→ b = c
a = b, b = c→ a = c Tr
a = b & b = c→ a = c L&
→ a = b & b = c ⊃ a = c R ⊃
In the other direction, assuming the premisses of rule Tr given, its conclusion is derived as follows:
→ a = b & b = c ⊃ a = c
Γ ′→∆′, a = b Γ ′′→∆′′, b = c
Γ ′,Γ ′′→∆′,∆′′, a = b & b = c R& a = c→ a = c
a = b & b = c ⊃ a = c,Γ ′,Γ ′′→∆′,∆′′, a = c L ⊃
Γ ′,Γ ′′→∆′,∆′′, a = c Comp
The other correspondences between rules and axioms are derived similarly. Note that rule Comp (i.e., a cut) is needed in the
direction from axioms to rules, but not in the direction from rules to axioms. Derivations in sequent notation soon grow to
unmanageable breadth.
The upper derivation shows a typical feature of mathematical rules, namely that logical rules can be applied after the
mathematical ones. The former can also be permuted to below the latter, because mathematical rules act only on atomic
formulas. An exception is rules with eigenvariables.
We show next that rule ET together with the logical rules of sequent calculus makes the axiom of noncollinearity
derivable:
x = y→ x = y
→ x = y,¬x = y R¬
z ∈ ln(x, y)→ z ∈ ln(x, y)
→ z ∈ ln(x, y),¬z ∈ ln(x, y) R¬
→ x = y, z ∈ ln(x, y),¬x = y & ¬z ∈ ln(x, y) R&
→ x = y, z ∈ ln(x, y), ∃x∃y∃z(¬x = y & ¬z ∈ ln(x, y)) R∃, R∃, R∃
→ ∃x∃y∃z(¬x = y & ¬z ∈ ln(x, y)) ET
In the other direction, assuming the premiss of rule ET given, we obtain its conclusion from the axiom of noncollinearity by
the derivation:
→ ∃x∃y∃z(¬x = y & ¬z ∈ ln(x, y))
Γ →∆, x = ym, z ∈ ln(x, y)n
¬x = y,¬z ∈ ln(x, y),Γ →∆ L¬, L¬
¬x = y & ¬z ∈ ln(x, y),Γ →∆ L&
∃x∃y∃z(¬x = y & ¬z ∈ ln(x, y)),Γ →∆ L∃, L∃, L∃
Γ →∆ Comp
The variables x, y, z are not free in Γ ,∆ so the eigenvariable condition on rule L∃ is met.
It follows by the above derivations that our rule calculus is equivalent to a standard axiomatic calculus for projective
geometry.
3. The subterm property
As the main result, we shall prove the subterm property for loop-free derivations in the rule systems for projective and
affine geometry. The latter proof is given in the next section.
Definition 3.1. A new term in a derivation of the atomic cases∆ from the atomic assumptions Γ is one that is not a term
in Γ ,∆. Terms in Γ ,∆ are known terms. The length of a term is the number of geometric constructions in it.
We show how to remove possible new terms from derivations of atomic cases∆ from atomic assumptions Γ in projective
geometry. Rule V is conservative over rules I–IV in such derivations, so the main lemma states the subterm property for
derivations by rules I–IV. The proof is long with lots of cases. We therefore give first a summary description:
Outline of the proof of themain lemma. The rules of projective geometry have the remarkable property that each term in a
conclusion is also a term in some premiss. Consider a new term ofmaximal length, say a line.We trace it to topformulas, and
find that the only way it can appear in these is through the zero-premiss incidence rules, say in a ∈ ln(a, b) or b ∈ ln(a, b).
In these, ln(a, b) is a new term of maximal length, and no ground terms can be new terms of maximal length. Terms are
removed from a derivation only through transitivity and substitution. In both, the new term ln(a, b) occurs in an equality.
The onlyway terms first appearing in an incidence can further downbe found in an equality is through ruleUni.We transform
uppermost instances of Uniwith the term ln(a, b) in a conclusion, so in the next step one of the following cases appears:
A. The new term is removed by Tr.
B. The new term is removed by SLn.
C. The new term reappears in an incidence as a conclusion of rule SLn.
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In case A, the other premiss of Tr is also an equationwith ln(a, b). If it is a conclusion of an uppermost instance of Uni, a proof
transformation removes the new term. If it is not, we trace up the term ln(a, b) until an uppermost Uni is reached and find
again one of A, B, or C. Case B leads either to the removal of ln(a, b) or to case A. In case C, there must be a second instance of
Uni that concludes an equation with the term ln(a, b). Permutations lead either to case A or to a second-to-uppermost Uni
with ln(a, b). Proof transformations are given that reduce this situation to the previously covered ones.
Lemma 3.2. If the atomic cases∆ are derivable from the atomic assumptions Γ by rules I–IV of plane projective geometry, there
is a derivation with no new terms.
Proof. The proof is divided into parts indicated by boldface numbers.
1. First occurrences of new terms. Consider a new term in a loop-free derivation, say a line l. The following condition can
be imposed:
Condition 1. The term l is a termofmaximum length among all new terms in the derivation and the first in the lexicographical
ordering of such terms.
Consider a downmost occurrence of a new term. The atom in which it occurs determines an upward subderivation in which
we trace up step by step atomswith the new term, until we arrive at topformula atoms. For l, these atoms belong to instances
of Ref, IPt, or ILn. The first is excluded because all applicable rules with l = l as one premiss give loops. With IPtwe have, say,
pt(l,m) ∈ l, but then pt(l,m) is a new term longer than l, against condition 1. Therefore only ILn1 and ILn2 are possible and
we have that l is identical to a line ln(a, b) for some points a, b, and the possible topformulas are
a ∈ ln(a, b) ILn1 b ∈ ln(a, b) ILn2
2. Rules that remove new terms. The rules that can remove the new term ln(a, b) are Tr and SLn. In both, ln(a, b) occurs as
a term in an equation in a premiss. The only rule that can introduce such an equation in the derivation is Uni, say, one of
c ∈ ln(a, b) c ∈ m d ∈ ln(a, b) d ∈ m
c = d ln(a, b) = m Uni
c ∈ m c ∈ ln(a, b) d ∈ m d ∈ ln(a, b)
c = d m = ln(a, b) Uni (1)
If m is identical to ln(a, b), the conclusion contains the reflexivity atom ln(a, b) = ln(a, b). When this atom is a premiss in
Sym, Tr, or SLn, a loop is found. Therefore the second and fourth (resp. first and third) premisses do not contain the term
ln(a, b). If (1) is an uppermost instance of Uni with the term ln(a, b) in a conclusion, ln(a, b) does not occur in an equation
in any upward branches that start from these premisses.
We prove the lemma by showing the following:
1. One instance of Uni. If the maximal number of instances of Uni with ln(a, b) in a conclusion is 1 in the threads of a
derivation, these instances can be converted so that no equation with the term ln(a, b) is concluded. Therefore there
cannot be any new term ln(a, b) left.
2. Reduction of the number of instances of Uni in the threads. If the maximal number of instances of Uni with ln(a, b) in a
conclusion is more than 1 in the threads of a derivation, it can be reduced.
Base case 1 and inductive case 2 mix in somewhat intricate ways in the proof.
3. The form of an uppermost uniqueness. Assume that (1) is an uppermost instance of Uni with the term ln(a, b) in a
conclusion, and consider its first premiss c ∈ ln(a, b). The only rule other than ILn that can conclude this premiss is SPt, and
the same for the first premiss of this instance of SPt until an instance of ILn is found. We may assume this to be the instance
a ∈ ln(a, b):
a ∈ ln(a, b) ILn1 a = a1
a1 ∈ ln(a, b) SPt a1 = a2
SPt....
am ∈ ln(a, b) am = c
c ∈ ln(a, b) SPt (2)
We can derive a = c by Tr from the right premisses in (2):
a = a1 a1 = a2
a = a2 Tr....
a = c (3)
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For the third premiss d ∈ ln(a, b), we have by analogous arguments
b = d (4)
In (4) it is assumed that a left premiss bn ∈ ln(a, b) of SPt, analogous to the premiss am ∈ ln(a, b) in (2), led to a topformula
instance b ∈ ln(a, b). In the contrary case of a ∈ ln(a, b), (4) would be the conclusion a = d. From this, together with (3),
the case c = d of (1) could then be derived without instances of Uni.
We now transform (1) by the use of (2)–(4) into
a ∈ ln(a, b) ILn1
....
a = c
c ∈ ln(a, b) SPt c ∈ m
b ∈ ln(a, b) ILn2
....
b = d
d ∈ ln(a, b) SPt d ∈ m
c = d ln(a, b) = m Uni (5)
The transformation is similar if the conclusion ism = ln(a, b).
4. Rules that conclude an equation with the new term. The term ln(a, b) appears first in an equation only as a conclusion
of Uni and remains in an equation in a conclusion as long as such an equation is a premiss in Sym or a premiss in Tr with
ln(a, b) not the middle term. We show that such instances of Sym and Tr can be deleted or permuted above Uni (5):
Assume thus that there is a root down from ln(a, b) = m in (5) with a sequence of instances of Sym and Tr until a step of
Tr in which ln(a, b) is a middle term or until a step of SLn with ln(a, b) in the second premiss is reached. If this branch has
two consecutive instances of Sym, delete both. If it has two consecutive instances of Trwe have, say
ln(a, b) = m m = n
ln(a, b) = n Tr n = l
ln(a, b) = l Tr (6)
with l,m, n distinct from ln(a, b). This is transformed into
ln(a, b) = m
m = n n = l
m = l Tr
ln(a, b) = l Tr (7)
In the end, we have an alternating sequence of single instances of Sym and Tr. Assume that there are at least two instances
of Sym, with the part of derivation
n = m
ln(a, b) = m
m = ln(a, b) Sym
n = ln(a, b) Tr
ln(a, b) = n Sym (8)
Transform this into
ln(a, b) = m
n = m
m = n Sym
ln(a, b) = n Tr (9)
If the conclusion of (9) is a first premiss in Tr, a transformation as in (7) is made to remove one Trwith line ln(a, b).
In the end, there is at most one instance of Sym and Tr, say
l = m
c ∈ ln(a, b) c ∈ m d ∈ ln(a, b) d ∈ m
ln(a, b) = m Uni
m = ln(a, b) Sym
l = ln(a, b) Tr (10)
This is transformed into
c ∈ m
l = m
m = l Sym
c ∈ l SLn c ∈ ln(a, b)
d ∈ m
l = m
m = l Sym
d ∈ l SLn d ∈ ln(a, b)
l = ln(a, b) Uni (11)
If the instances of Sym and Tr are in the other order as compared to (10), the transformation is the same as (11).
If there is just one instance of Sym that concludesm = ln(a, b) from ln(a, b) = m and no Tr, we interchange the first and
second premisses, and the third and fourth premisses, of Uni (5), to obtain the conclusion without Sym. If there is just one
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instance of Trwith ln(a, b) in the conclusion, we have one of
ln(a, b) = m m = n
ln(a, b) = n Tr
l = m m = ln(a, b)
l = ln(a, b) Tr (12)
The second is transformed as in (11), and the first analogously.
By the above permutations, we are left with three possible ways in which the term ln(a, b) in the conclusion of (5) can
appear as a premiss in a successive rule:
A. ln(a, b) is a middle term in a premiss in Tr.
B. ln(a, b) is the left term in a second premiss of SLn.
C. ln(a, b) is the right term in a second premiss of SLn.
These cases correspond to those in the outline of the proof. Cases A and B remove the new term. These are treated in 5 below
and case C in 6. We now impose:
Condition 2. Uppermost instances of Uniwith ln(a, b) in a conclusion have been transformed as in 3 and 4.
5. Removal of new terms. We assume first that there is at most one instance of Uni with ln(a, b) in a conclusion along
threads. The term ln(a, b) in the conclusion of (5) is removed by Tr or SLn and we have two subcases:
5.1. If the rule is Tr, we have
l = ln(a, b) ln(a, b) = m
l = m Tr (13)
By assumption, also the first premiss is a conclusion of an uppermost instance of Uni and we have, say,
c ′ ∈ l c ′ ∈ ln(a, b) d′ ∈ l d′ ∈ ln(a, b)
l = ln(a, b) Uni (14)
(The first conclusion c ′ = d′ of (14) can be left unwritten here and later.) We conclude as for (3) and (4) that
a = c ′ (15)
and
b = d′ (16)
are derivable. The upward branches from these equations do not contain the term ln(a, b) in an equation. The step of Tr
that removes ln(a, b) now has a first premiss given by (14) and a second premiss given by (5). It is transformed, with some
obvious instances of Sym left unwritten, into
c ′ ∈ l
c ′ = a a = c
c ′ = c Tr
c ∈ l SPt c ∈ m
d′ ∈ l
d′ = b b = d
d′ = d Tr
d ∈ l SPt d ∈ m
l = m Uni (17)
The instances of Uni that conclude equations with the term ln(a, b) have been removed.
5.2. If the term ln(a, b) is removed by SLn, we have
e ∈ ln(a, b) ln(a, b) = m
e ∈ m SLn (18)
We consider the derivation of the first premiss. Possible rules are ILn, SPt, and SLn and we have three subcases:
5.2.1. The first premiss of (18) is an instance of ILn that we may assume without loss of generality to be a ∈ ln(a, b). Then e
is identical to a and the derivation is
a ∈ ln(a, b) ILn1 ln(a, b) = m
a ∈ m SLn (19)
It is converted, by the use of the second premiss of (5) and by (3), into
c ∈ m c = a
a ∈ m SPt (20)
The instance of Uniwith the term ln(a, b) in the conclusion has been removed.
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5.2.2. The first premiss of (18) is concluded by rule SPt and we have
f ∈ ln(a, b) f = e
e ∈ ln(a, b) SPt ln(a, b) = m
e ∈ m SLn (21)
Rule SLn is permuted up:
f ∈ ln(a, b) ln(a, b) = m
f ∈ m SLn f = e
e ∈ m SPt (22)
This case leads to the removal of Uni as in 5.2.1.
5.2.3. The first premiss of (18) is concluded by rule SLn and we have
e ∈ l l = ln(a, b)
e ∈ ln(a, b) SLn ln(a, b) = m
e ∈ m SLn (23)
The derivation is transformed into
e ∈ l
l = ln(a, b) ln(a, b) = m
l = m Tr
e ∈ m SLn (24)
This case leads to a step of transitivity that removes ln(a, b), covered by case 5.1.
Assume next that there is along threads more than one instance of Uniwith the term ln(a, b). If the first premiss in (13)
is not a conclusion of an uppermost instance of Uniwith the term ln(a, b), we trace up ln(a, b) until an uppermost instance
is reached. Now one of the cases A–C at the end of 4 applies and we continue the proof analysis as in 5. If in repeating this
process the term ln(a, b) is never a right term in the second premiss of SLn (case C), occurrences of ln(a, b) become removed
in the same way as in 5.1 and 5.2.1. Otherwise case C is met:
6. A new term in an incidence.We are left with the case in which the term ln(a, b) in an equation in (5) is a premiss in SLn
after which it appears in an incidence:
e ∈ m
c ∈ m c ∈ ln(a, b) d ∈ m d ∈ ln(a, b)
m = ln(a, b) Uni
e ∈ ln(a, b) SLn (25)
The conclusion can be a premiss in SPt, SLn, or Uni and we have three subcases:
6.1. If e ∈ ln(a, b) is a premiss in SPt, the other premiss is some e = f and SPt permutes to the first premiss of SLn:
e ∈ m m = ln(a, b)
e ∈ ln(a, b) SLn e = f
f ∈ ln(a, b) SPt ❀
e ∈ m e = f
f ∈ m SPt m = ln(a, b)
f ∈ ln(a, b) SLn (26)
Eventually an instance of SLn or Uni is found:
6.2. If e ∈ ln(a, b) is a premiss in SLn, the other premiss is some ln(a, b) = n and the derivation and its permutation are
e ∈ m m = ln(a, b)
e ∈ ln(a, b) SLn ln(a, b) = n
e ∈ n SLn ❀
e ∈ m
m = ln(a, b) ln(a, b) = n
m = n Tr
e ∈ n SLn (27)
If there is just one Uniwith ln(a, b) along threads, case 5.1 applies. If not, we trace up from ln(a, b) = n to an uppermost Uni
with ln(a, b).
6.3. Eventually the transformations in 6.1 and 6.2 lead to the third and final subcase of 6 in which e ∈ ln(a, b) is a premiss
in Uni. The conclusion has the term ln(a, b) and the relevant part of derivation is
e ∈ m
c ∈ m c ∈ ln(a, b) d ∈ m d ∈ ln(a, b)
m = ln(a, b) Uni
e ∈ ln(a, b) SLn e ∈ n f ∈ ln(a, b) Rule f ∈ n
ln(a, b) = n Uni (28)
Rule can be an instance of ILn, SPt, or SLn and we have three subcases:
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6.3.1. If Rule is ILnwith, say, f identical to a, (28) is transformed into
c ∈ ln(a, b)
a ∈ n c = a
c ∈ n SPt d ∈ ln(a, b)
d ∈ m
c ∈ m c = a
a ∈ m SPt a ∈ n e ∈ m e ∈ n
m = n Uni
d ∈ n SLn
ln(a, b) = n Uni (29)
The number of instances of Uni along threads with ln(a, b) in the conclusion has been reduced.
6.3.2. If Rule is SPt with a second premiss g = f , the order of the premisses of the uppermost Uni in (28) is changed to
conclude ln(a, b) = m (twice) and (28) is transformed into
ln(a, b) = m
e ∈ m e ∈ n
g ∈ ln(a, b) g = f
f ∈ ln(a, b) SPt ln(a, b) = m
f ∈ m SLn f ∈ n
m = n Uni
ln(a, b) = n Tr (30)
The upward branch from f ∈ m is covered by case 5.2. Note that the last step is at this point not yet transformed as in 3 and
4, but only after the aforementioned branch has been removed of the term ln(a, b).
6.3.3. If Rule is SLn, it has a second premiss l = ln(a, b) and the derivation is
e ∈ m m = ln(a, b)
e ∈ ln(a, b) SLn e ∈ n
f ∈ l l = ln(a, b)
f ∈ ln(a, b) SLn f ∈ n
ln(a, b) = n Uni (31)
There are two threads that contain at least two instances of Uniwith ln(a, b) in a conclusion. The transformed derivation is
ln(a, b) = l
e ∈ m
l = ln(a, b) ln(a, b) = m
l = m Tr
e ∈ l SLn e ∈ n f ∈ l f ∈ n
l = n Uni
ln(a, b) = n Tr (32)
If l = ln(a, b) is a conclusion of an uppermost instance of Uni, the subderivation down to l = m is transformed as in (17)
with both of the uppermost instances of Uni removed from the derivation.
If l = ln(a, b) is not a conclusion of an uppermost Uni, we trace up ln(a, b) until an uppermost instance is found. All cases
that can arise are now covered.
By the above process, all occurrences of ln(a, b) become removed. If a longest new term is a point, it is removed in a
process dual to the above. By repeating the removal, all new terms, in descending order of length, become removed. QED.
We show next that the existence of noncollinear points, rule V, is conservative over rules I–IV for derivations that contain
only atomic formulas:
Lemma 3.3. If the atomic cases ∆ are derivable from the atomic assumptions Γ by rules I–V of plane projective geometry, they
are already derivable by rules I–IV.
Proof. We write the proof using sequent calculus notation. Assume that there is a loop-free derivation of Γ → ∆ with
instances of rule ET, and consider a first such instance, withm ⩾ 0, n ⩾ 0 copies of the two formulas closed by the rule
Γ →∆′, x = ym, z ∈ ln(x, y)n
Γ →∆′ ET
The premiss is derived by rules I–IV, so Lemma 3.2 applies to it. If a first occurrence of the eigenvariables x, y, z is found in
an initial sequent, there are eigenvariables in the antecedent, against the variable restrictions. Therefore such occurrences
are possible only in instances of Ref or ILn. The former is excluded, because all possible rules with a reflexivity atom give a
loop. For rules ILn, the only known line term with eigenvariables in the derivation of the premiss of rule ET is ln(x, y) and
first occurrences of eigenvariables in ILnmust therefore be of the form
→ x ∈ ln(x, y) ILn1 → y ∈ ln(x, y) ILn2
There is noway inwhich the term z could occur in a topsequent and therefore there is no atom z ∈ ln(x, y) in the derivation,
so that n = 0. This leaves the derivable sequent Γ → ∆′, x = ym, with x, y not terms in Γ ,∆′. Tracing x and y up to
topsequents, Ref is excluded as before. Connecting lines that contain x or y and occur in Γ ,∆′ would violate the variable
restrictions. Thus, such lines are new terms and there is no instance of ILnwith x or y, so that alsom = 0. The conclusion of
the rule is identical to its premiss so the instance of rule ET can be removed. QED.
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Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 give us immediately the following:
Theorem 3.4. If the atomic cases∆ are derivable from the atomic assumptionsΓ by rules I–V of plane projective geometry, there
is a derivation in which all terms are terms in Γ ,∆.
Given a problem of derivability of atomic cases ∆ from atomic assumptions Γ in projective geometry, proof search can be
limited to the terms known from Γ ,∆. There are a bounded number of distinct atomic formulas with terms from Γ ,∆.
Therefore there are also a bounded number of loop-free derivations, and derivability is decidable through terminating proof
search, which gives the solution to the word problem of plane projective geometry.
Derivations are in tree form except when there is an instance of rule Uni. For the fragment without Uni, derivability can
be decided, by well known results, by a polynomial-time algorithm, but not so for the full system.
As promised, we shall now indicate how the proof of Lemma 3.2 could in principle, if sufficiently broad journal pages
existed, be reproduced in a sequent calculus formulation of the mathematical rules. The essential property of the natural
deduction formulation was that each conclusion of a rule was at once the premiss in a successive rule. A derivation is
translated into a sequent notation by collecting all the open assumptions into a multiset Γ and all the cases into another
multiset∆. In the proof of Lemma 3.2, instances of rules I–IV are such that only one formula is active in a premiss. Therefore,
since there are no eigenvariables that could block a permutation, the order of rules can be so transformed that a given atomic
formula P active in a given rule was the principal formula in a preceding rule. Next, we considered an uppermost instance
of rule Uni, the only rule with more than one principal formula. Therefore there are above it only rules with the above-
mentioned property of permutability. It is now a routine matter to check that the proof transformations (28) to (32), with
more than one instance of Uni, can be carried through when they are written in sequent notation. Overall, the only thing
that happens when the proof is carried through in sequent notation is that sequent arrows and commas and contexts are
added, but the proof transformations themselves remain as they are.
4. The axioms and rules of affine geometry
Toobtain an axiomsystem for affine geometry, the following additions andmodifications to the projective axiomatization
of Section 2 are made:
There is one additional relation (atomic formula) and construction:
(4.1) l ‖ m, l andm are parallel lines,
(4.2) par(l, a), the parallel to line l through point a.
The additional affine axioms are:
I General axioms for parallelism:
l ‖ l, l ‖ m ⊃ m ‖ l, l ‖ m &m ‖ n ⊃ l ‖ n
II Affine axioms of incidence and parallelism:
a ∈ par(l, a), par(l, a) ‖ l
III Affine uniqueness axiom:
a ∈ l & a ∈ m & l ‖ m ⊃ l = m
IV Affine substitution axiom:
l ‖ m &m = n ⊃ l ‖ n
The rules to be added to projective geometry are:
I Rules for the parallelism relation:
l ‖ l Ref
l ‖ m
m ‖ l Sym
l ‖ m m ‖ n
l ‖ n Tr
II Rules for incidence and parallelism:
a ∈ par(l, a) IA par(l, a) ‖ l Par
III Uniqueness of parallels:
a ∈ l a ∈ m l ‖ m
l = m Unipar
IV Substitution rule:
l ‖ m m = n
l ‖ n SA
It will be useful to distinguish between transitivity for line equality and that for parallelism by writing TrLn and TrPar.
We shall next prove the subterm property for loop-free derivations in affine geometry.
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Lemma 4.1. If the atomic cases∆ are derivable from the atomic assumptions Γ by rules I–IV of plane affine geometry, there is a
derivation with no new terms.
Proof. The proof is an extension of the proof for projective geometry in Lemma 3.2 andwe consider only the new cases. The
numbering of parts of the proof is as in Lemma 3.2 and the numbering of derivations continues that of 3.2.
1. First occurrences of new terms. Consider a line par(l, a) that is a new term of maximal length in a loop-free derivation.
First occurrences of the term are in
a ∈ par(l, a) IA par(l, a) ‖ l Par
2. Rules that remove new terms. The term par(l, a) can be removed by rules TrLn,TrPar, SLn, and SA. We consider first the
case in which par(l, a) does not occur in an equality in the derivation. Only TrPar can remove it:
m ‖ par(l, a) par(l, a) ‖ n
m ‖ n TrPar (33)
If either premiss is derived by TrPar, the latter is permuted above it as in (6) and (7). If the right premiss has been derived
by SA, TrPar is again permuted above. If both premisses are derived by Sym, we have
par(l, a) ‖ m
m ‖ par(l, a) Sym
n ‖ par(l, a)
par(l, a) ‖ n Sym
m ‖ n TrPar (34)
A single step of TrPar followed by Sym gives the conclusion from the two premisses of the two instances of Sym. In the end,
we arrive at the derivation
par(l, a) ‖ l Par
l ‖ par(l, a) Sym par(l, a) ‖ l Par
l ‖ l TrPar (35)
The conclusion follows as an instance of Ref, with the part of derivation containing the new term deleted.
We can now assume that the term par(l, a) appears in an equality in the derivation. Rules that can introduce par(l, a) in
an equality are
c ∈ par(l, a) c ∈ m d ∈ par(l, a) d ∈ m
c = d par(l, a) = m Uni (36)
c ∈ par(l, a) c ∈ m par(l, a) ‖ m
par(l, a) = m Unipar (37)
and similarly with par(l, a) as the right term of the equality.
3. The form of an uppermost uniqueness. Let (37) be an uppermost uniqueness rule with par(l, a) in the conclusion. The
first premiss c ∈ par(l, a) has been derived, as in (2), by point substitutions, and the first occurrence of the new term is in
a ∈ par(l, a). The derivation is transformed, as in (3), into
a ∈ par(l, a) IA
....
a = c
c ∈ par(l, a) SPt (38)
In the derivation of the third premiss par(l, a) ‖ m of (37), only rules Par, Sym, TrPar, and SA can appear, with par(l, a) not
in the second premiss of the last one. The derivation transforms into either
par(l, a) ‖ l Par
....
l ‖ m
par(l, a) ‖ m TrPar (39)
or
par(l, a) ‖ l Par
....
l = m
par(l, a) ‖ m SA (40)
If rule Uni is, as in (36), the uppermost uniqueness rule, consider the premisses c ∈ par(l, a) and d ∈ par(l, a). As in (38),
we conclude a = c and a = d. Therefore c = d, the first conclusion of (36), follows, and the instance of Uni can be deleted.
We can now assume that first occurrences of par(l, a) in equations are in conclusions of rule Unipar.
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4. Rules that conclude an equation with the new term. The new term introduced into an equation by (37) remains in an
equation if the equation is a premiss of Sym or a premiss of TrLn with par(l, a) not the middle term. The analysis proceeds
as in (6)–(9), with the result that there is at most one Sym and one TrLn following Unipar, say
k = m
c ∈ par(l, a) c ∈ m par(l, a) ‖ m
par(l, a) = m Unipar
m = par(l, a) Sym
k = par(l, a) TrLn (41)
This is transformed into
c ∈ par(l, a)
c ∈ m
k = m
m = k Sym
c ∈ k SLn
par(l, a) ‖ m
k = m
m = k Sym
par(l, a) ‖ k SA
k ‖ par(l, a) Sym
k = par(l, a) Unipar (42)
If the instances of Sym and TrLn are in the other order, the transformation is similar.
We now have k = par(l, a) (or par(l, a) = k) as a conclusion of an uppermost Unipar. The step that follows it is one of
the following:
A. TrLnwith par(l, a) the middle term.
B. SLnwith par(l, a) the removed term.
C. SLnwith par(l, a) the right term in the second premiss.
D. SAwith par(l, a) a term in the second premiss.
5. Removal of new terms.We consider cases A and B that remove the new term:
In case Awe have a step of TrLnwith the premisses k = par(l, a) and par(l, a) = k′. By the transformations as in 4, both
premisses become conclusions of Unipar, as in
c ∈ k c ∈ par(l, a) k ‖ par(l, a)
k = par(l, a) Unipar
c ′ ∈ par(l, a) c ′ ∈ k′ par(l, a) ‖ k′
par(l, a) = k′ Unipar
k = k′ TrLn (43)
By (38), a = c and a = c ′, so c = c ′. Derivation (43) is transformed into
c ∈ k
c ′ ∈ k′ c ′ = c
c ∈ k′ SPt
k ‖ par(l, a) par(l, a) ‖ k′
k ‖ k′ TrPar
k = k′ Unipar (44)
The instances of Uniparwith par(l, a) in the conclusion have been removed.
In case B, the term par(l, a) is removed by SLn and the conclusion of Unipar is of the form par(l, a) = k, so we have the
steps
d ∈ par(l, a)
c ∈ par(l, a) c ∈ k par(l, a) ‖ k
par(l, a) = k Unipar
d ∈ k SLn (45)
If the first premiss is an instance of IA, then d is identical to a. We have, as in (38), a = c , so the premiss c ∈ k gives a ∈ k
without Unipar.
The other cases of derivation of the first premiss are treated similarly to the proof of Lemma 3.2, cases 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
We have now covered cases A and B.
6. Now consider case C in which par(l, a) is a right term in the second premiss of SLn. We have the steps
e ∈ k
c ∈ k c ∈ par(l, a) k ‖ par(l, a)
k = par(l, a) Unipar
e ∈ par(l, a) SLn (46)
As for the projective case, consider rules in which the conclusion is a premiss:
6.1. e ∈ par(l, a) is a premiss in SPt. The case is treated as the one for projective geometry.
6.2. e ∈ par(l, a) is a premiss in SLn. The case is treated as the one for projective geometry.
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6.3. e ∈ par(l, a) is a premiss in Unipar. We have the steps
e ∈ k
c ∈ k c ∈ par(l, a) k ‖ par(l, a)
k = par(l, a) Unipar
e ∈ par(l, a) SLn e ∈ n par(l, a) ‖ n
par(l, a) = n Unipar (47)
Wemay assume (47) to be an uppermost case of its kind. Therefore par(l, a) does not appear in an equation in the derivation
of the third premiss of either Unipar. Analysis of the derivations of these premisses, as in (39) and (40) of 3, shows that one
of l = k and l ‖ k is derivable for the upper Unipar, and one of l = n and l ‖ n for the lower one. We have then altogether
four cases:
1. l = k and l = n. The conclusion par(l, a) = n follows from the conclusion of the upper Unipar by steps of TrLn, so the
case reduces to A.
2. l = k and l ‖ n. Now k ‖ n follows, so e ∈ k, e ∈ n give by rule Unipar the conclusion k = n. Then par(l, a) = n follows
as in 1.
3. l ‖ k and l = n. This goes through as 2.
4. l ‖ k and l ‖ n. Now k ‖ n and this goes through as 2.
Each of these cases reduces to case A.
6.4. e ∈ par(l, a) is a premiss in Uni. The steps of the derivation are
e ∈ k′
e ∈ k
c ∈ k c ∈ par(l, a) k ‖ par(l, a)
k = par(l, a) Unipar
e ∈ par(l, a) SLn f ∈ k′ f ∈ par(l, a)
par(l, a) = n Uni (48)
As in (38), c ∈ par(l, a) gives a = c and f ∈ par(l, a) likewise a = f . Therefore f ∈ k follows from c ∈ k, and we have the
transformed steps
e = f
e ∈ k′ e ∈ k f ∈ k′ f ∈ k
k′ = k Uni
c ∈ k c ∈ par(l, a) k ‖ par(l, a)
k = par(l, a) Unipar
k′ = par(l, a) TrLn (49)
Now par(l, a) is a middle term in TrLn and the case is covered by A.
7. In case D, par(l, a) is a term in a premiss of SA. We have two cases:
7.1. par(l, a) is the removed term in SA:
l′ ‖ par(l, a)
c ∈ par(l, a) c ∈ k par(l, a) ‖ k
par(l, a) = k Unipar
l′ ‖ k SA (50)
We may assume that par(l, a) is not in an equation in the derivation of the first premiss of SA. As in 6.3, we get from that
premiss and the third premiss of Unipar four cases: l′ = l and l = k etc, and each leads to the elimination of Unipar that
concludes an equation with par(l, a).
7.2. par(l, a) is the right term in the second premiss of SA:
l′ ‖ k
c ∈ k c ∈ par(l, a) k ‖ par(l, a)
k = par(l, a) Unipar
l′ ‖ par(l, a) SA (51)
The third premiss of Unipar gives the two cases k = l and k ‖ l, and these in combination with l′ ‖ k lead to l′ ‖ par(l, a)
without rule Unipar.
Themain part of the proof is now finished. In the proof for the projective case, it was sufficient to consider a line as a new
term, the case of a point being dual. In affine geometry, new points can be introduced through rule IA, as in a ∈ par(l, a).
However, if a is a new term, also par(l, a) is, and a cannot be a new term of maximal length. Our final task is therefore
to control that the addition of the rules of affine geometry does not interfere with the proof of the subterm property for
projective geometry. The essential case to consider is an instance of Unipar with a new term of maximal length ln(a, b) in
its conclusion, this being an uppermost occurrence of ln(a, b) in an equation, as in
c ∈ ln(a, b) c ∈ m ln(a, b) ‖ m
ln(a, b) = l Unipar (52)
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The third premiss has been concluded by Sym, TrPar, or SA, with ln(a, b) always in a parallelism in a premiss. Only rule Par
can introduce such a new term, but it cannot have an instance with ln(a, b) a maximal term, so a term ln(a, b) as in (52) is
not a new term. QED.
Lemma 4.2. If the atomic cases ∆ are derivable from the atomic assumptions Γ by rules I–V of plane affine geometry, they are
already derivable by rules I–IV.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3.3, consider a first instance of rule ET. Rules IA and Par give possible new topformulas,
However, if they contain any of x, y, z, or ln(x, y), they also contain a par-construction with eigenvariables which would be
a new term. QED.
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 give us immediately the
Theorem 4.3. If the atomic cases∆ are derivable from the atomic assumptions Γ by rules I–V of plane affine geometry, there is
a derivation in which all terms are terms in Γ ,∆.
Derivability is decidable by a bounded proof search, as in the case for projective geometry at the end of the previous section.
5. Two example applications
We give a couple of brief applications of proof analysis in geometry, to illustrate the control over the structure of
derivations made possible by the restriction of proof search to known geometric objects.
5.1. Consistency
As a first application of the results of the previous sections, we obtain proofs of consistency. The standard formulation of
consistency within sequent calculus is that the empty sequent → is underivable. Here we obtain the more general result
that any finite set of atomic formulas is consistent:
Theorem 5.1. If Γ contains only atoms, the sequent Γ → is not derivable in plane projective or affine geometry.
Proof. If Γ → is derivable it is derivable without rule ET, by Lemma 3.3 for projective and Lemma 4.2 for affine geometry.
The remaining rules always have at least one formula as a conclusion. QED.
5.2. Euclid’s fifth postulate
As a second application of the system of rules of affine geometry, we consider Euclid’s fifth postulate: Given a point a
outside a line l, no point is incident with both l and the parallel to l through point a. Axiomatically, we may express this by
the formula
¬a ∈ l ⊃ ¬(b ∈ l & b ∈ par(l, a))
It takes some effort to derive this formula from the axioms of affine geometry by standard methods of logical inference.
Here, we can express the postulate as the ‘‘logic-free’’ sequent
b ∈ l, b ∈ par(l, a)→ a ∈ l
Rule Unipar is essential in its derivation in our system:
Theorem 5.2. If rule Unipar is deleted from the system of plane affine geometry and if the points a and b are not identical, the
sequent
b ∈ l, b ∈ par(l, a)→ a ∈ l
is not derivable.
Proof. No rule matches the assumptions b ∈ l, b ∈ par(l, a). The zero-premiss rule Ref produces loops and IA and Par give
a ∈ par(l, a) and par(l, a) ‖ l. Now rule Sym gives l ‖ par(l, a), and after it only loops are produced. QED.
With rule Unipar added, the proof search is straightforward: The two assumptions b ∈ l and b ∈ par(l, a) together with
par(l, a) ‖ l give par(l, a) = l, so a ∈ par(l, a) gives by line substitution a ∈ l.
6. Historical remarks
The first one to have attempted a combinatorial analysis of formal derivations in elementary geometry was Thoralf
Skolem in 1920. The date is remarkable, because systematic theories of the structure of proofs in mathematics were
developed only from the 1930s on. Foremost among these are the sequent calculi and systems of natural deduction of
Gentzen [2].
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Skolem’s paper is famous for the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, included in the first section; other sections dealt with
lattice theory, plane projective geometry, and infinitary combinatorics. Skolem found a polynomial-time algorithm for the
derivability problem of an atomic formula from a given number of atomic formulas in lattice theory, a result rediscovered
in the late 1980s. Skolem’s argument is very difficult to follow. It is clear that he conceived of the axioms of lattice theory as
rules of inference, but there are no clear signs of any permutability arguments. Such arguments were first given in [7], for
a formulation of lattice theory with explicit meet and join operations. Skolem, instead, used a relational formulation, with
a predicate M(a, b, c) that can be read as ‘‘c is the meet of a and b,’’ and similarly for join. In [8], a proof of the subterm
property for a formulation as in Skolem’s early paper is given, along lines that are one possible reconstruction of Skolem’s
argument.
Skolem used also in projective geometry a relational formulation of the theory and solved the derivability problem for an
axiomatization that did not include noncollinearity. He was able to give a purely syntactic proof of the independence of the
conjecture of Desargues. Instead of constructions, Skolem [11] has axioms that guarantee the existence of connecting lines
and of intersection points, such as the axiom ∀x∀y∃z(x ∈ z & y ∈ z). It is known, by the results of [4], that a proof-theoretical
analysis will not work if to such axioms there is added an axiom of the form of noncollinearity.
Skolem’s system of projective geometry was reformulated in terms of Gentzen’s sequent calculus by Ketonen [3]. He also
extended it to affine geometry, but again without the axiom of noncollinearity. Ketonen’s method was to have instances of
the axioms in the antecedent part, and to apply cut elimination. A summary of Ketonen’s thesis can be found in [1], and a
more detailed discussion in [9]. Ketonen’s arguments are as hard to follow as Skolem’s. The geometrical parts of Skolem’s
1920 paper and of Ketonen’s thesis have remained completely unknown, even if both works have otherwise had a profound
effect.
Note: After this paper was written, we made a systematic study of Skolem’s [11] work on plane projective geometry,
published as von Plato [10]. It is shown there in great detail that Skolem’s results are based on the same type of permutative
arguments as the ones used here. The difference is that he lacked a formal notation for derivations and therefore could not
present the permutations in any systematic way. They are presented in our 2007 work within the same natural deduction
style calculus as above. A new result is the following: If one atomic formula P is derivable from the atomic assumptions Γ in
plane projective geometry, it is derivable without rule Uni. Thus, a proper use of a rule with a multiple conclusion requires
a result with more than one case. The proof is through a proof transformation by which instances of rule Uni get removed
from a derivation of P from Γ .
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